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ANATOMY OF STRATEGIC AFFILIATIONS - A
CORPORATION'S LIABILITIES FOR THE
ACTS OF ITS AFFILIATES
Daniel Leckrone, Esq.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Affiliations between business entities have occurred with in-
creasing frequency during the seventies and eighties, and have come
to be relatively common transactions following relatively well un-
derstood structural patterns. While a variety of motives account for
the identity of the participants and the structures selected, they
nonetheless produce reasonably predictable outcomes in terms of
various business and legal issues ranging from market share to the
tax treatment of the consideration exchanged.
The affiliation is perceived to be "strategic" in current parlance
when it brings together individuals and organizations whose re-
sources complement one another and will facilitate the achievement
of identified goals or objectives. This popular formula therefore
brings together entities whose planned business activities are per-
ceived to have a tactical affinity or relationship which will generate
a synergistic or enhanced result - the "two plus two equals five"
effect.
There is however, a collateral effect which is often unantici-
pated by the business and legal executives involved in the planning
and execution of these transactions, and which tends to emerge on
the heels of some adversity. The less well understood and less pre-
dictable facet of these affiliations is that the more intrinsic good
* Mr. Leckrone received a B.S. from Indiana University's School of Business in 1960
and a J.D. from its School of Law in 1963. He spent the first seven years of his career as a
trial lawyer and the next twelve moving through the chairs in corporate law departments
serving as General Counsel for the domestic as well as the international affairs of Memorex
Corporation. Since 1982, he has served as Chief Legal Officer for a number of technology
based growth companies in Silicon Valley on a time-shared basis. His practice is a domestic
and international corporate and business practice focused on planning, financing, and imple-
menting legal structures and affairs which facilitate growth internally as well as by affiliation.
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sense the affiliation makes, the greater the likelihood that classical
concepts of limited liability will be displaced by legal doctrines
which place responsibility for the acts of the participants on those
who are managing, controlling, or benefiting from the activities.
Fundamental to the recognition of this element of the relation-
ship is the acceptance of a corresponding oversight or audit respon-
sibility to assure that the participants share on an on-going basis
common perceptions of what constitutes acceptable conduct and ac-
ceptable risk, because they are in all likelihood sharing the resulting
exposure. The business and legal executives' fiduciary obligations
as well as the dictates of good management and good sense mandate
diligence in the scrutiny of the activities undertaken in pursuit of
the common objectives to assure that those activities are consistent
with the standards imposed within the executive's own company by
its own policies and procedures.
In exploring the pitfalls, our methodology will be to first briefly
review the basics of a corporation's legal responsibility. Second, to
identify the essence of a strategic affiliation. Third, to portray that
essence in the context of a fact pattern commonly encountered in
technology driven transactional environments. And lastly, the arti-
cle will analyze the impact of that essence on the relationships be-
tween the entities in the context of four concepts or doctrines of law
not thought to be particularly unique to California jurisprudence.
II. BASICS OF LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS
The California corporation exists by virtue of a grant of au-
thority by the state intended to promote economic efficiency. The
fundamental elements of the corporation thought necessary to pro-
mote that economic efficiency are the potential for continuous exist-
ence, the limitation of the owners' liability for the acts of the entity
to their investment in the entity, the free transferability of the own-
ership interests in the entity, and the existence of an entity separate
from the natural persons involved.' The traditional economic ra-
tionale for this shift was the perception that the creditor is in a bet-
ter economic position to evaluate and divert potential risk,2 that
intra-organizational efficiencies are created by the shift, and that an
1. MARSH, MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATE LAW 1 § 4.1 (1987) (hereinafter
MARSH). For a discussion on the legal fiction of the corporate person, see Schane, The Cor-
porate Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TULANE L. REV. 563 (1987).
2. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1973) (hereinafter Posner). Posner reasons
that due to the creditors' market position, they are in a greater position to evaluate and defer
the risk of an organization.
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investment market is created by this shift.3
A corporation as an entity lacks the physical capacity to act for
itself and therefore can only act through others, either natural per-
sons or other corporations acting in various capacities such as em-
ployee, officer, director, shareholder, or agent. The legal
responsibility of a corporation is, therefore, always based on the acts
of others. The nature of that responsibility depends on the nature
of the relationship between the corporation and the actor. The law
defines the relationship, in each case assigning to the actor the au-
thority to act and to the corporation a corresponding responsibility
for the act.
In many jurisdictions, the legislative development of the con-
cept of limited liability4 predated the corporate entity's right to own
an interest in another corporation.5 The underlying rationale for
limited liability for the equity investor is arguably not present when
that investor is a corporation and not a natural person.6
III. THE ESSENCE OF A STRATEGIC AFFILIATION
A strategic affiliation is the coming together of individuals and
organizations whose resources complement one another and will fa-
cilitate the achievement of an identified business goal or objective.
While the financial resources of one or more of the entities is
usually relied upon for financing the undertaking, the essence of the
relationship is the existence of a tactical affinity between their re-
3. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52-U. CH. L.
REv. 89, 93-101 (1985); and Blumberg, Limited Liability and the Corporate Group, 11 J.
CORP. LAW 573, 612-16 (1986). Both of these articles set forth numerous factors that
demonstrate the desirability of business organizations to possess limited liability.
4. See Note, Should Shareholders be Personally Liable for the Torts of their Corpora-
tion, 76 YALE L. J. 1190 (1967) (quoting Nicholas Murrary Butler) "[Tihe limited liability
Corporation is the greatest single discovery of modem man."
5. California adopted a standard of limited liability for the shareholders of a corporate
entity in 1931. From 1849 to 1931, California held that the equity investors in a corporation
would share proportionally in the liabilities of the corporation. For a discussion of this his-
torical background, see MARSH, supra note 1, ch. XV § 15.13, pp. 329-33. At the time of this
adoption, corporations were not in the position to be shareholders of other corporations, and
that limited liability would run to a corporate shareholder was not part of the understanding
which led to the adoption of limited liability. See BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE LAW (hereinafter BLUMBERG 1) at pp. 56-62.
6. "The multiplicity of artificial personalities is far from the original concept of the
grant of power to create an artificial personality for business convenience." Berle, Jr., The
Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 343, 344 (1947). See Halpern, Trebilock &
Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporate Law, 30 U. TORONTO L. J.
118 (1980); Hadden, Inside Corporate Groups, 12 INT'L J. Soc. L. 271 (1984); and Easter-
brook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 89 (1985) (here-
inafter Easterbrook & Fischel).
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spective business resources and objectives, rather than merely the
existence of financial wherewithal. The existence and utilization of
these resources to pursue agreed upon objectives distinguishes the
relationship from that occupied by the parties in a mere financing
transaction customarily structured by banks or investors.7
IV. COMMON FACT PATTERN IN TECHNOLOGY DRIVEN
TRANSACTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
A natural affinity exists between an entity which has developed
the ability to mass produce high quality precision products at low
cost, and an entity whose fundamental skills involve research and
development, product engineering, marketing, and sales. In recent
years, this affinity has tended to promote the following hypothetical
scenario in computer and other technology driven industries.
MFGCO is a billion dollar manufacturer able to mass produce
high quality, electronic products at low cost. MFGCO organized
INTERCO to identify and structure business activities which would
advance the interests of MFGCO. Mr. PROMOTER was ap-
pointed President of INTERCO and allowed to acquire a minority
interest in INTERCO which was subject to repurchase rights and
pledges in favor of MFGCO.
Two years ago, MFGCO agreed with Mr. PROMOTER to
provide several million dollars to fund a program to bring the lead-
ing edge Nubox product and manufacturing technology to
MFGCO. STARTCO was to be organized and managed by IN-
TERCO to implement the Nubox program without disclosing the
involvement of MFGCO until necessary. Funds from MFGCO
were channeled through INTERCO to STARTCO through a series
of loan and guarantee transactions. Sixty percent of STARTCO
common stock was purchased by INTERCO for about five percent
of STARTCO's estimated capital requirements. The remaining
forty percent of STARTCO stock was made available for grant to
STARTCO founders and key managers, all of which was subject to
repurchase rights in favor of STARTCO and INTERCO.
STARTCO's remaining capital requirements were to be provided
by MFGCO in the form of debt.
INTERCO and MFGCO agreed that STARTCO would be
funded by INTERCO, and would hire Mr. ENGINEER as a
7. A comprehensive discussion of the liability exposure of the parties to a financing
transaction can be found at Marcellino and Kenfield, Due Diligence as a Two Edged Sword:
Potential Liability of Venture Capitalists Funding High-Tech Start-Up, 2 S. C. COMP. H.
TECH. L. J. 41 (1986).
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founder to assemble the personnel and vendors necessary to develop
a Nubox product very similar to the Nubox product recently intro-
duced by TECHCO, and to acquire the necessary expertise and
technology needed to manufacture the Nubox product. The Nubox
product and manufacturing technology would then be transferred
to MFGCO for high volume manufacturing under agreements pro-
viding STARTCO with a continuing supply of Nubox products and
allocating marketing rights between MFGCO, INTERCO, and
STARTCO.
Representatives of both INTERCO and MFGCO knew that
Mr. ENGINEER was an ex-employee of TECHCO, that he had
been directly involved with the development of TECHCO's Nubox,
and that he had had access to TECHCO's Nubox drawings, design
information, technical data, vendor information, and trade secrets.
MFGCO and INTERCO took no action to assure that Mr. ENGI-
NEER did not utilize TECHCO's proprietary properties in the de-
sign of the STARTCO product.
The companies became operationally and structurally en-
twined as the plan was pursued. Mr. PROMOTER, MFGCO exec-
utives, and a variety of other INTERCO and MFGCO agents and
employees were involved in and controlled all STARTCO decisions
of a traditional corporate or headquarters nature. Most directors
and officers of INTERCO and STARTCO, except for Mr. ENGI-
NEER, were directors and/or officers of MFGCO or INTERCO.
STARTCO and INTERCO were not engaged in any activities other
than the Nubox plan, and were used to procure equipment and ma-
terial for MFGCO and INTERCO as the plan progressed. The
companies often used the same law firms.
Careful review of the STARTCO business plan would reveal
that Mr. ENGINEER lacked the technical credentials necessary to
reverse engineer Nubox, and that STARTCO was not provided
with the time or the money to independently develop Nubox tech-
nology. However, over the ensuing months, drawings and proto-
types for a Nubox emerged on time and vendors capable of
implementing sophisticated processes to produce precision parts
were readily identified.
Mr. ENGINEER had secretly taken copies of TECHCO's
Nubox drawings and data when he left TECHCO and was copying
the drawings and otherwise using the data in the development of
STARTCO's Nubox product. In so doing, he infringed the copy-
rights covering the drawings, and appropriated the trade secrets re-
lated to the materials and processes. The STARTCO Nubox
1988]
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product which emerged incorporated the wrongfully appropriated
TECHCO trade secrets and infringed the TECHCO patents issued
on the design, reflected in the copied drawings.
As STARTCO's Nubox product and manufacturing technol-
ogy was developed, it was transferred and taught to MFGCO en-
abling MFGCO to learn the technology and manufacture the
Nubox product.
At some point in time, Mr. PROMOTER as the President of
INTERCO and MFGCO executives reasonably should have real-
ized that the STARTCO Nubox resulted from the appropriation
and utilization of TECHCO proprietary property. When TECHCO
learned that its drawings had been used by Mr. ENGINEER, it so
advised STARTCO and MFGCO, but they made no effort to either
purge themselves of the materials or to procure a license from
TECHCO. STARTCO, INTERCO, and MFGCO continued to
transfer and utilize the technology, and attempted to conceal the
facts with denials and threats of expensive litigation.
V. IMPACT ON THE AFFILIATES OF FOUR DOCTRINES
A. The Doctrine of Principal and Agent
An agent is an entity which represents another entity in dealing
with a third party.' As a general rule in California, more is re-
quired for the creation of an agency relationship than a parent cor-
poration's majority control of a subsidiary.9
At common law, the doctrine of agency relied upon the exist-
ence of a consensual relationship between the parties to constitute
them as principal and agent. In the absence of a consensual rela-
tionship, the courts required a high degree of control by a parent
over a subsidiary before an agency relationship could be inferred.
In the often repeated words of Justice Cardozo written in 1925
"[d]omination may be so complete, inference so obtrusive, that by
the general rule of agency the parent will be a principal and the
subsidiary an agent."10 Consequently, at common law the doctrine
of agency was of little value in establishing inter-corporate liability.
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2295 (Deering 1987).
9. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 259, 274, 551 P.2d 847, 131
Cal. Rptr. 231 (1976); Walker v. Signal Cos., 84 Cal. App. 3d 982, 14 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1978);
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M (1958). A corporation does not become an
agent of another corporation merely because a majority of its voting shares are held by the
other.




However, California recognizes by statute two methods for the
creation of an agency relationship.11 A traditional consensual
agency relationship can be created by an express authorization to
act before the fact. A person or corporation is the "agent" of an-
other person or corporation - called the "principal" - if he is
authorized to act for or in place of the other person or corporation.
The statute also provides that an agency relationship can be created
by a subsequent ratification, if a non-consensual relationship has
been expressly created. Therefore, conduct of an agent binds the
principal if the conduct is either (a) authorized, i.e., within the
scope of the agent's authority; or (b) ratified by the principal.
With respect to authorization, it is not necessary that conduct
be expressly authorized by the principal to bring it within the scope
of the agent's authority. Conduct is within the scope of his author-
ity if it occurs while the agent is engaged in the duties which he was
assigned to perform and it relates to those duties. Also, conduct for
the benefit of the principal which is incidental, customary, or rea-
sonably necessary for the performance of assigned duties is likewise
within the scope of the agent's authority. 12
The concept of ratification applies to conduct which was not
authorized at the time it occurred. The law provides that if at the
time of the conduct the agent lacks authority, the conduct may be-
come binding upon the principal if the principal adopts and thus
gives effect to the conduct. The most common way for a principal
to ratify conduct is to voluntarily accept the benefits of the agent's
conduct.13 Once ratified by the principal, the prior conduct of the
agent is treated as having been authorized in advance. 14
Generally the acceptence of benefits will constitute a ratifica-
tion only if the principal had full knowledge of the facts at the time
of ratification.15 The courts will not require the full knowledge if
11. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2307 (Deering 1987). An agent may be created, and an author-
ity may be conferred, by precedent authorization or a subsequent ratification.
12. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2330 (Deering 1987). An agent represents his principal for all
purposes within the scope of his actual or ostensible authority, and all rights and liabilities
which would accrue to the agent from the transactions within such limits, if they had been
entered into on his own account, accrue to the principal.
13. Agency relationships are always considered by the courts as oral and able to be
ratified by acceptance of the benefits therein with notice. Carrier v. Piggly Wiggly of S.F., 11
Cal. App. 2d 180, 182-83, 53 P.2d 400 (1936). See Rakestraw v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal. 3d 76, 500
P.2d 1401, 104 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1972); Sphan v. Guild Indus. Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 156, 156
Cal. Rptr. 375 (1979); Commonwealth Ins. Sys., Inc. v. Kersten, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 1026,
115 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1974).
14. Supra note 11.
15. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2310 (Deering 1987). A ratification can be made only in the
manner that would have been sufficient to confer an original authority for the act ratified, or
1988]
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the lack thereof is due to the negligence of the principal. That is, if
the principal was ignorant of the facts because of his own failure to
investigate after the circumstances were such as to raise a question
and cause a reasonable person to inquire, the principal will be held
to have ratified the unauthorized conduct of the agent.16
Issues of knowledge and notice assume an additional dimen-
sion in the context of a corporate principal. The court must deter-
mine the point at which an entity lacking any intrinsic capacity to
know is deemed to have known. Corporations are, however, rou-
tinely chargeable with the conduct and knowledge of others.
The California Courts have broadly defined the scope of cor-
porate knowledge. In Monteleone v. Southern California Vending
Corp., the court held that evidence demonstrating knowledge by of-
ficers and certain employees of the principal corporation was ade-
quate to hold that the corporation possessed sufficient knowledge to
have ratified the agent's actions. 17
Another determination of corporate knowledge was made in
Northern Natl Gas of Omaha v. Superior Court.' This case in-
volved an attempt to quash service of summons for want of jurisdic-
tion.19 Mr. Larson was the president of both the parent and the
subsidiary corporations. The court held that based on the doctrine
of imputed knowledge, Mr. Larson was "chargeable of the state-
ment, representations, acts, and conduct of the employees" of the
subsidiary regardless of any actual knowledge. 20 The court con-
cluded that since Mr. Larson was also president of the parent cor-
poration, the knowledge that was imputed to Mr. Larson as
president of the subsidiary would also be imputed to him as the
president of the parent corporation.2'
What conclusions would a trier of fact be most likely to reach
when asked to apply the doctrine of principal and agent to the rela-
where an oral authorization would suffice, by accepting the benefit of the act, with notice
thereof.
16. Reusche v California Pacific Title Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App.2d 731, 42 Cal. Rptr. 262
(1965). Ordinarily, the law requires that a principal be appraised of all of the facts surround-
ing a transaction before he will be held to have ratified the unauthorized act of the agent.
However, where ignorance of the facts arises from the principal's own failure to investigate
and the circumstances are such as to put a reasonable man on inquiry, [cites] he may be held
to have ratified despite lack of full knowledge.
17. Monteleone v. Southern California Vending Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 798, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 703 (1968).
18. Northern Nat'l Gas of Omaha v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. App. 3d 891, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 850 (1976).
19. Id.




tionship between MFGCO, INTERCO, and STARTCO in our pat-
tern? That:
1. MFGCO was the principal responsible for the Nubox plan;
STARTCO and INTERCO were the agents of MFGCO in
the execution of the Nubox plan; the acts of Mr. ENGI-
NEER, Mr. PROMOTER, and MFGCO executives in fur-
therance of the Nubox plan were the acts of their employers
and principals.
2. Arguably, Mr. ENGINEER's misappropriation and use was
"authorized" by MFGCO because the structure of the
Nubox plan made misappropriations and use of TECHCO
proprietary property incidental or reasonably necessary.
3. More significantly, however, the misappropriation and use
was certainly "ratified" by MFGCO because MFGCO failed
to prevent its agents INTERCO and STARTCO from con-
tinuing the appropriation and utilization of TECHCO pro-
prietary property after MFGCO knew or should have known
what had occurred. MFGCO continued to accept the bene-
fits of the Nubox plan.
4. Having ratified the misappropriation and use of TECHCO
proprietary properties by its agents INTERCO and
STARTCO, MFGCO has the same legal responsibility for
the acts of STARTCO and INTERCO as if MFGCO had
directed and authorized the acts in advance.
B. The Joint Venture Doctrine
A joint venture is an undertaking by two or more entities
jointly to carry out a single enterprise for profit,22 and is character-
ized by the existence of the following elements:
1) a community of interests in the subject of the undertaking.
2) a sharing of profits and losses.
3) an "equal right" or a right in some measure to direct and
control the conduct of each other and of the enterprise.
4) a fiduciary relation between or among the parties.23
A joint venture does not require an express agreement between the
22. April Enter., Inc. v. KTrV, 147 Cal. App. 3d 805, 819, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1983);
Holtz v. United Plumbing & Heating Co., 49 Cal. 2d 501, 506-07, 316 P.2d 612 (1957); Spier
v. Lang, 4 Cal. 2d 711, 716, 53 P.2d 138 (1935). California does not recognize a distinction
between the doctrines ofjoint enterprise and joint venture. See Connor v. Great Western Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 863 note 4, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969); Boyd v.
White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 657, 276 P.2d 92 (1954); Ambrose v. Alioto, 65 Cal. App. 2d
362, 366, 150 P.2d 502 (1944); Larson v. Lewis-Simas-Jones Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 83, 89, 84
P.2d 296 (1938).
23. Stillwell v Trutanich, 178 Cal. App. 2d 614, 3 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1960).
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parties.2 4 The court will infer such an intention from the actions of
the participants in the venture, and once such an inference is drawn,
each member of the venture becomes liable for the actions of the
other.25
The requirements of participation and control are liberally de-
fined for joint venture arrangements, 26 and, for example, can be sat-
isfied by an agreement between the parties that one will simply
invest funds, while the other maintains control over the opera-
tions.27 Further, the courts will not dispute the existence of a joint
venture for lack of community of interest simply because one party
has only contributed capital, another only property, and a third
only services.28
The lynch pin of the joint venture analysis is an intention to
jointly share in profits.29 California has broadly characterized such
arrangements as sufficient to constitute profit sharing for purposes
of finding a joint venture.30 The lack of an intention to share jointly
in losses will not negate the existence of a joint venture.31
The generally accepted definition of profit sharing distinguishes
between profits which are earned jointly and profits which are
earned severally. The profits in whatever form earned, however,
24. See Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 749-50, 177 P.2d 931 (1947); Rickless v.
Temple, 4 Cal. App. 3d 869, 892, 84 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1970); Singleton v. Fuller, 118 Cal. App.
2d 733, 740, 259 P.2d 687 (1953).
25. Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 749, 177 P.2d 931 (1947); Universal Sales
Corp. v. California Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 764-65 (1942); April Enter., Inc. v. KTTV, 147
Cal. App. 3d 805, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1983); Rickless v. Temple, 4 Cal. App. 3d 869, 892, 84
Cal. Rptr. 826 (1970).
26. "The requirement of authority and control has been construed to mean that while
in the absence of a special agreement one joint venturer cannot bind the other, they may by
agreement grant authority to one or more of their number which would not be implied from
the relationship alone." Stillwell, supra note 23; Sime v. Malouf, 95 Cal. App. 2d 82, 95-6,
212 P.2d 956 (1949); Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal. App. 2d 435, 452, 261 P.2d 529 (1953).
27. See Oakley v. Rosen, 76 Cal. App. 2d 310, 173 P.2d 55 (1946).
28. See Kovack v. Reed, 49 Cal. 2d 166, 169, 315 P.2d 314 (1957); James v. Herbert,
149 Cal. App. 2d 741, 748, 309 P.2d 91 (1946).
29. 6 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW (8th ed. 1974), Partnership, § 17, p.
4269.
30. "While in a technical joint venture there is usually a sharing of profits and losses in
the prosecution of the common enterprise, the mode of participating in the fruits may be left
to the agreement of the parties." Universal Sales Corp. v. California, 20 Cal. 2d 751, 764
(1942).
31. E. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIPS § 52.9, p. 476 (Ist ed. 1960), Joint Ad-
venture. See also Lemming v. Oilfields Trucking Co., 44 Cal. 2d 343, 282 P.2d 23 (1955);
Darity v. Driesal, 706 P.2d 995, 998-91 (1986); Stratford Group Ltd. v. Interstate Bakeries,
590 F. Supp. 859 (1984); Hellenic Lines v. Commodities Bagging & Shipping, 611 F. Supp.
665 (1985); Swann v. Ashton, 330 F.2d 995 (1964); Fedderson v. Goode, 112 Colo. 38, 145
P.2d 981 (1944).
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must be the joint property of the parties before division.32 Histori-
cally, the courts have narrowly defined the term profits. Recently,
courts have been more willing to consider an interest in the prod-
uct jointly developed as evidence of profit sharing.33 Rawley pro-
vides a helpful explanation of joint profits.
Not every joint operation which results in benefit for the parties
constitutes a sharing of profits which characterize a joint adven-
ture. The profits, in whatever form earned, must be the joint
property of the parties before division.34
The profits to be gained from the Nubox plan took a variety of
forms: the technology itself, the rights to use the technology to
manufacture the product, the rights to market the product and the
right to use the technology in the development and manufacturing
of future products, and the more traditional forms of pecuniary
profit which could be generated by the sale of these rights or by the
sale of products produced by the exercise and utilization of the
rights. As between MFGCO, INTERCO, and STARTCO, the
rights had been allocated generally giving MFGCO the manufactur-
ing rights and STARTCO and INTERCO the marketing rights.
With respect to the pecuniary profits, at least two opportunities
exist for allocation among MFGCO, INTERCO, and STARTCO.
The first is a function of the transfer price agreed to between the
manufacturer and the re-seller. To the extent the transfer price ex-
ceeds the manufacturer's cost, profit appears on the operating state-
ment of MFGCO as the manufacturer. To the extent the transfer
price is less than the resale price which the product commands in
the market place, profit will appear on the operating statement of
STARTCO and INTERCO as the marketers and re-sellers of the
Nubox. The agreement setting the transfer price is thus an agree-
ment to allocate the aggregate gross profit representing the delta
between the manufacturing cost and the sales price to an affiliated
party. Although few courts have had occasion to deal with this sub-
tle form of agreement to allocate profits in connection with a joint
venture analysis, a discussion can be found in a fairly recent federal
court decision.35
32. Darity v. Driesal, 706 P.2d 995, 998-91 (1986).
33. See Pros v Mid-America Computer Corp., 491 N.E.2d 851, 862 (Ill. App. 2d Dist.
1986). In this case the Illinois court states a willingness to consider the aquisition of title in a
software system as evidence of joint profits.
34. RAWLEY, supra note 32.
35. See Sasportes v M/V Sol De Copacabana, 581 F.2d 1204, 1208 (5th Cir. 1978). The
court agrees that in certain circumstances transfer price agreements could be sufficient for the
joint profits requirement.
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A second opportunity to allocate pecuniary profits among
MFGCO, INTERCO, and STARTCO as affiliated parties is in the
allocation of ownership interests in the entities on whose operating
statement the profit occurs. Without actually changing the owner-
ship among the affiliated entities, the profits can also be allocated by
changing the rights and preference of the securities representing the
ownership.
There is thus an abundant basis for the instruction of a trier of
fact which would lead to the conclusion that MFGCO, INTERCO,
and STARTCO were joint venturers and as such, each are responsi-
ble for the acts of the others taken in the course of their pursuit of
the venture including, of course, the wrongful appropriation and
use of trade secrets by STARTCO and its employees.
C. The Alter Ego Doctrine
Alter Ego is a judicially created equitable doctrine which disre-
gards the corporate entity and extends liability to its shareholders36
when necessary to avoid an unfair result and do justice.3 7 The doc-
trine is based on a recognition of the corporate charter as a privilege
granted to the shareholders whose separation from the corporate
entity will be recognized unless justice demands otherwise."
The California courts have limited the application of the alter
ego doctrine to ". . . narrowly defined circumstances and only when
justice so require."39 Traditionally the courts have only applied the
doctrine upon the showing of abuse, misuse, and fraud.40 Cur-
rently, other jurisdictions are beginning to show a willingness to
apply the doctrine ". . . in the absence of fraud or illegallity to pre-
vent injustice and inequitable consequences."'" This notion of fair-
ness is evident in the historical application of the alter ego
doctrine. 2
36. MARSH, supra n.1, ch. 15.
37. Pan Pacific Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale Park Inc., 166 Cal. App. 2d 652, 654,
333 P.2d 802 (1958).
38. ". . . [C]ourts start with the premise that entity law controls and that entity law
exists to serve a fundamental principle underlying the corporate system - the principle of
'limited liability.' This leads to the corollary that the disregard of entity should be ap-
proached 'reluctantly' or 'cautiously' and should be undertaken only in 'exceptional' cases."
BLUMBERG I, p. 106.
39. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 302, 216 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1985).
40. McLoughlin v. L. Bloom Sons Co., Inc., 206 Cal. App. 2d 848, 854 (1962).
41. Messick v Moring, 514 So.2d 892, 894 (1987).
42. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 302, 216 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1985).
Citing LArTY the Court states: "The essence of the alter ego doctrine is that justice be done.
What the formula comes down to, once shorn of verbiage about control, instrumentality,
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While the doctrine has been applied to both corporate and nat-
ural person shareholders, scholars demonstrate that the courts have
shown a greater willingness to disregard the corporate entity when
the shareholder is a corporation rather than a natural person.43
They attribute this willingness to an intellectual difficulty in ex-
tending limited liability beyond the corporate group.'
The alter ego doctrine is likewise applied with greater fre-
quency when the injured party is an involuntary creditor.45 Here
again the courts tend to focus on "fairness." A voluntary creditor is
thought to be in a much better position to evaluate the risks of deal-
ing with a particular entity, and equity therefore does not demand
the application of the doctrine with such frequency.46
The courts will look to numerous factors in determining alter
ego liability.47 The California Supreme Court, in the case of Minton
agency and corporate entity is that liablity is imposed to reach equitable results' (LATTY,
SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS p. 191 (1936))."
43. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 110-11; Hachney & Bensen, Shareholder
Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 837, 873 (1982); Hamilton, The Corpo-
rate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REv. 979, 992 (1971).
44. See supra note 7.
45. "An involuntary creditor who has had foisted upon him a subsidiary unable to
respond to the damages has a greater equity." Note, Liability of a Corporation for the Acts of
a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1122, 1130 (1958).
46. Douglas & Shanks, Isolation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39
YALE L. J. 193 (1929).
47. In Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 806 (1962), the court set out the factors to be considered:
1. Commingling, diversion or manipulation of assets between parent and
subsidiary;
2. The treatment of the individual asset of the subsidiary as their own;
3. The subsidiary's failure to obtain authority to issue stock;
4. The holding out by the parent of their responsibility for the debt of the
subsidiary;
5. The failure to maintain or the commingling of the subsidiary's corporate
minutes or records;
6. Identical, equitable ownership of the two entities;
7. Substantially similar directors, officers, or management;
8. The use of the same business location;
9. Undercapitalization;
10. The use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit of a
single venture or the business of an individual or another coporation;
11. Misrepresentation or concealment of the responsible ownership;
12. The disregarding of legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm's
length relationships among related entities;
13. Intent to use the corporate entity as a shield from liability in the dealings
with a third party; and
14. The use of the corporate entity to procure labor, services or merchandise
for another person or entity.
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v. Cavaney, described the process as follows: 48
The trier of fact must consider whether (1) such unity of interest
in ownership exists so as to dissolve the separate corporate per-
sonalities of the parent and the subsidiary, relegating the latter to
the status of merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or ad-
junct of the former; (2) an equitable result will occur if the con-
duct is treated as that of the subsidiary alone.
49
The unity of interest requirement does not mandate the complete
ownership of a subsidiary by a parent. The court is concerned with
the use of the control that generates inequitable conduct.5 0 In the
absence of any injustice involving the parent corporation, the court
will honor their separateness."1
Two factors consistently regarded as the most significant are
undercapitalization and economic integration. Undercapitalization
is the measure of both the degree and kind of capitalization made
available to the entity in relation to the risks and requirements gen-
erally associated with the business.5 2 The courts are concerned with
the reasonableness of the capital structure in comparison to the
norms of the industry."
The second factor assigned particular significance is economic
integration. 4 The emphasis is on interrelationship, either horizon-
tally or vertically, of the corporate activity. Where the activites are
so complementary, the foundation is laid for piercing the corporate
veil. As indicated in the Connecticut case of Zaist v Olson:
If plaintiff can show that there was such a unity of interest and
ownership that the independence of the corporation had in effect
48. 56 Cal. 2d 576, 365 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
49. Id. at 119.
50. Fidenas AG v. Honeywell, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 1029 (1980); Washington Nat'l Corp.
v. Thomas, 494 Ariz. 2d 530, 570 P.2d 1269 (1977); Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 335
P.2d 107 (1959); BLUMBERG I at p. 133.
51. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 301 (1985); McLoughlin v. L.
Bloom Sons Co., Inc., 206 Cal. App. 2d 848, 854, 24 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1962).
52. See Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 985-89 (1971). For a
discussion on the calculations used in making the determination of the adequacy of capitali-
zation, see BARBER, Piercing the Corporate Veil, CORPORATE PRACTICE COMMENTATOR
610, 633-39 (1981).
53. Automotriz del Golfo de California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792 (1957).
54. For case law demonstrating economic integration as a factor in the corporate group
alter ego analysis, see Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 302-3, 702 P.2d 601,
216 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1985); Pan Pacific Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale Park Inc., 166 Cal.
App. 2d 652, 333 P.2d 802 (1958); Parker v. Bell Asbestos Mines Ltd., 607 F. Supp. 1397
(1985); Washington Nat'l Corp. v. Thomas, 494 Ariz. 2d 530, 570 P.2d 1268 (1977); Old
Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (1976). Some scholars conclude that economic
integration is the foundation of intergroup liability. See BLUMBERG I at p. 195.
55. Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967).
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ceased, or had never begun, an adherence to the fiction of sepa-
rate identity would serve only to defeat justice and equity by per-
mitting the economic entity to escape liability arising out of an
operation of a corporation for the benefit of the whole
enterprise.1
6
Since the essence of a strategic affiliation is the existence and
utilization of complementary resources to pursue an identified busi-
ness objective, the relationship is intrinsically economically inte-
grated. The logic enunciated in Zaist, makes it apparent that the
better the economic fit, or the more strategic the affiliation, the
more likely it is that the separateness of the corporate entities will
be disregarded under the alter ego doctrine. The existence of eco-
nomic integration alone, or even with other factors generally looked
to by the courts, will not automatically trigger the application of the
alter ego doctrine.57
Alter ego involves a facts and circumstances test, and the
courts are fundamentally result oriented in its application.5"
Although the traditional tests have focused on abuse, misuse, or
fraud, a strong argument can be made based on current case law
that the doctrine should be applied where equity so demands re-
gardless of the presence of illegality. 9
The typical fact pattern includes extensive economic integra-
tion, undercapitalization, and intrusive control and intervention
into the subsidiary's operations. Separate corporate existence of
STARTCO would almost certainly be disregarded to render
MFGCO amenable to the claims of TECHCO and involuntary
creditors.
D. The Enterprise Doctrine
Yet another basis for imposing liability on all participants in a
strategic affiliation for the acts of each participant taken in pursuit
of their common plan is the doctrine of enterprise liability. The
basis of the doctrine is the proposition that damages caused by an
economically integrated group pursuing an activity should be borne
by those with some logical relationship with the enterprise activ-
ity.6" The doctrine correlates the corporate legal fiction with eco-
56. Id. at p. 576. For a discussion, see Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Connecticut,
5 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 109 (1983).
57. Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967).
58. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d at 301 (1985).
59. Supra note 41.
60. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 COLO. L. REV. 153, 158
(1975).
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nomic reality by treating interrelated groups of corporations
pursuing a common economic motive as a single organizational
business unit.61
Professor Latty, in his 1936 work on subsidiary and affiliate
corporations, concludes that rather than attempting to fit the inter-
related corporate group into a doctrine of "oneness" sought by alter
ego, the focus should be on the purpose for limited liability. 62 If
that purpose is to protect the uninvolved shareholder (whether cor-
porate or natural), it is fully served by permitting liability to spread
to other economically involved entities, but not to their respective
uninvolved shareholders. Proponents of the enterprise doctrine as-
sert that extending limited liability throughout the corporate mem-
bers of the integrated group is overprotection and economically
unjustifiable. 3
The United States Supreme Court recently added its endorse-
ment to the recognition of the existence and significance of the en-
terprise. Applying the antitrust laws in the case of Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.," the Court held that a parent
and a wholly owned subsidiary were incapable of conspiring with
one another to restrict trade because they are both participants in
61. See Berne, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 843 (1947);
Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L. J. 1
(1980).
62. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS, p. 196 (1936).
"Once attention is focused on the denial of limited liability, rather than on
some mystical aspect of what a corporation is, entirely disconnected from the
pragmatic aspect of what it does, the significant difference between the corpo-
rate and individual stockholder suggests itself. The difference is not that the
parent corporation is a person 'created by law' while the individual stockholder
is a person 'created by the almighty,' or that the parent hath no soul or that it
is an intangible, invisible essence into which there can be merged another in-
tangible, invisible essence so as to create a conceptional oneness more easily
than in the case of an individual stockholder. The difference is simply that the
parent corporation has already achieved limited liability, or rather, its' stock-
holders have; in other words, in allowing recovery against the parent, there is
no denial of limited liability so long as the recovery does not go back to the
parent to reach its stockholders and subject them to unlimited liability. But if
in allowing recovery against the parent, there is no complete denial of limited
liability, there is very obviously a limitation of that accepted principle. This
limitation is achieved by recognizing in law what is an economic fact in nearly
all of the parent-subsidiary cases reported, viz., that the parent with all of its
subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries constitutes a single economic unit."
63. BLUMBERG I at p. 99. "Limited liability has unthinkably been carried beyond the
original objective of insulating the ultimate investor for debts of the enterprise, so that the
doctrine now enables a corporate group to insulate each corporate tier of the group and thus
achieve layers of insolation for the parent corporation from the liability from the obligations
of numerous subsidiaries."
64. 467 U.S. 753, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
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the same enterprise. The Court considered the economic reality as
opposed to the legal formality65 and concluded that just as the busi-
ness enterprise should be free to select the structure method of its
operations, the Court should be likewise free to deal with the reality
of those structures.6
In Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Assoc. 67 the court
found that defendant Great Western was part of an economically
integrated corporate group that built, sold, and financed a particu-
lar real estate venture and was liable to purchasers of structurally
defective homes. In applying the guidelines of Biakanja v. Irving,68
the court held that Great Western owed a duty to insure the integ-
rity of the property sold. Great Western's failure to check the land
resulted in the breach of their duty, and they were subsequently
found liable for the harm caused the injured homeowners.69
Although the direct holding of Connor70 as applied to financial
institutions has been subsequently overruled by legislative action71
the case indicates the court's support for the applicability of an en-
terprise approach to intragroup liability. Further support is found
in two subsequent cases applying intragroup responsibility for the
actions of individual member entities involving insurance72 and
products liability.73
Once again the question is, will the trier of fact examine the
relationship of the parties and their respective responsibility for one
another's acts? And once again the inquiry has revealed that the
character and purpose of the relationships between the parties to a
strategic affiliation provide yet another basis in the law for each par-
ticipant being held accountable for the acts of each of the other
65. Id.
66. Id. at pp. 772-74.
67. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
68. Biankja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). The court looked to:
1. The extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff;
2. The foreseeability of harm to plaintiff;
3. The degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered injury;
4. The closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered;
5. The moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct; and
6. The policy of preventing future harm. (HARTWVELL, Suits Against Business
Entities: Substantive Issues, in ADVANCED TRIAL PRACTICE SERIES; Suits
Against Business Entities: Secondary Target, p. 7 (1986).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3434 (Deering 1987).
72. See Delos v. Farmer's Ins. Group, 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1979).
73. See Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
1988]
18 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JO URNAL
participants. Under the enterprise theory, the traditional limita-
tions on liability which would ordinarily insulate the shareholder/
parent from the implications of the acts of its corporate subsidiary
are set aside because the two have become participants in the pur-
suit of a common enterprise. Under the enterprise doctrine, the col-
lective resources of the participants which were available to the
enterprise will be made available to TECHCO as an involuntary
creditor seeking compensation for the misappropriation and in-
fringement of its proprietary properties by STARTCO in its pursuit
of the enterprise plans.
VI. CONCLUSION
Taking considerable literary license, the involuntary creditor
whose claims arose out of acts of the debtor in connection with a
business plan agreed to among the debtor and other entities bring-
ing complementary resources to the table, can in all likelihood be
heard to say: "How do I love thee? Let me count the ways.74 I love
thee as an agent, as a joint venturer, as an alter ego, and as an
enterpriser."
The pitfall of the strategic affiliation is a lesser understood and
less predictable facet of this type of relationship. That is, the more
intrinsic good sense the affiliation makes, the greater the likelihood
that classical concepts of limited liability will be displaced by legal
doctrines which place responsibility for the acts of the participants
on those who are managing, controlling, or benefiting from the
activities.
Fundamental to the recognition of this element of the strategic
affiliation is the acceptance of a corresponding oversight or audit
responsibility. This would assure that the participants share, on a
continuous basis, common perceptions of what constitutes accepta-
ble conduct and acceptable risk. This is necessary because they are
in all likelihood sharing the resulting exposure. The business and
legal executives' fiduciary obligations as well as the dictates of good
management and good sense mandate diligence in the scrutiny of
the activities undertaken in pursuit of the common objectives to as-
sure that those activities are consistent with the standards imposed
within the executive's own company by its own policies and
procedures.
74. From: ELIZABETH BARRETr BROWNING, SONNETS FROM THE PORTUGUESE,
XLIII, ed. W. Peterson (Barre; 1977).
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